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In the context of recent debates about surface reading, critical description, and 
symptomatic interpretation, this article argues that the work of the philosopher and 
literary theorist, Richard Rorty, can open up new methodological possibilities for critics 
concerned with theories and practices of close reading. I suggest that, though Rorty’s 
own textual analyses routinely fail to respond to the aesthetic distinctiveness of the 
works he discusses, his accounts of “inspired reading” and “liberal irony” together pave 
the way for a more compelling critical practice. To substantiate this claim, the second 
half of the article offers a new reading of Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire, a novel that, 
perhaps more concertedly than any other, raises fundamental questions about reading 







Close Reading, Epistemology, and Affect: Nabokov After Rorty 
 
We are absurdly accustomed to the miracle of a few written signs being able to 
contain immortal imagery, involutions of thought, new worlds with live people, 
speaking, weeping, laughing.  
— Vladimir Nabokov, Pale Fire1  
 
 In recent years, literary critics have revisited basic disciplinary questions about 
how texts can or should be read with particular urgency. This article argues that the 
work of the philosopher and literary theorist, Richard Rorty, can open up new 
methodological possibilities for critics concerned with theories and practices of close 
reading.2 Though his work has garnered much interest across the humanities and 
social sciences, as Gunter Leypoldt points out, “Rorty’s authority as a literary scholar 
has remained ambiguous.”3 I will suggest that critics are right to be sceptical about the 
value of Rorty’s literary scholarship, primarily because his readings of particular works 
routinely fail to register and respond to their aesthetic distinctiveness, what Derek 
Attridge has called the “singularity” of literature.4 Nevertheless, this article will also 
suggest that Rorty’s under-discussed characterization of “inspired reading,” together 
with his account of “liberal irony,” can help us rethink our critical priorities and purposes 
in the context of current debates about surface reading, critical description, and 
symptomatic interpretation, recently described by Rita Felski as “the method wars.”5 
Such a reassessment makes available a more compelling critical practice—one that 
is more explicitly concerned with the affective investments that compel a critic to care 
and write about a given work in the first place; that is more willing to admit and explore 
the implications of the myriad ways that texts elude understanding; and that is more 
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pragmatist about the disciplinary “knowledge” of what literary works are.  
 To demonstrate this, I turn to the fiction of Vladimir Nabokov, which has caused 
no end of interpretative trouble for readers and critics. Rorty famously devoted a 
chapter of one of his most influential works, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), 
to Lolita (1955) and Pale Fire (1962), arguing that cruelty is “the worst thing we do,” 
and that Nabokov’s novels “warn the liberal ironist intellectual’’—the hero of Rorty’s 
philosophy—“against temptations to be cruel.”6 For Rorty at least, then, there is a close 
affinity between his and Nabokov’s thought. Despite an initial flurry of interest, 
however, Rorty’s discussion has not had a lasting impact on Nabokov criticism, 
ordinarily meriting no more than a passing reference in recent commentaries—a 
reception indicative of wider feelings about Rorty in literary studies today.7 The latter 
part of this article aims to illustrate the value of Rorty’s thought for contemporary 
criticism through a short discussion of Pale Fire—a novel which concertedly raises 
questions about reading, and which represents Nabokov’s most recalcitrant and 
alluring work of fiction.8 My reassessment of the tenor and tone of Rorty’s writings on 
literature, as well as the disparity between his theoretical pronouncements and his 
critical practice, makes it necessary to quote more extensively than is usually desirable 




 “Most philosophers,” Rorty cheerfully suggested in 2002, “typically have one 
set of ideas which they repeat over and over again,” and he was no exception.9 Rorty’s 
idea, first articulated in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), consists of two 
interrelated polemics: that philosophers should abandon a representationalist 
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epistemology which conceives knowledge as the accurate representation of reality, 
and that they should also abandon a correspondence theory of truth, where sentences 
are deemed true by virtue of corresponding to the way things “really” are.10 In 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty summarized this argument by distinguishing 
between “the world,” which exists “out there” and is not solely a human creation, and 
“truth,” understood as a property of language: “To say that the truth is not out there is 
simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are 
elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations. … 
Only descriptions of the world can be true or false” (CIS, p. 5). For the “ironist,” no 
description or interpretation is intrinsically closer to reality than any other, though 
descriptions can be more or less useful for different purposes. It is in the context of 
advocating for the value of a multitude of diverse descriptions that Rorty accords 
literature a special importance in human culture: “A sense of human history as the 
history of successive metaphors would let us see the poet, in the generic sense of the 
maker of new words, the shaper of new languages, as the vanguard of the species” 
(CIS, p. 20). Thus, a persistent trope in Rorty’s oeuvre is about the need to change 
the conversation—to stop asking questions about truth and reality, and instead ask 
questions like: “Does our use of these words get in the way of our use of those other 
words?” (CIS, p. 12).11  
 Rorty was right to characterize most of his writings after Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature as defenses of his arguments in that book or elaborations about what 
a post-epistemological culture—later a “poeticized” (CIS, p. 53) or “literary” culture—
might look like.12 In the middle phase of his career, when the emphasis on literature 
was greatest, this primarily involved exploring the consequences for ethics once 
epistemology has fallen by the wayside. For Rorty’s liberal ironist, questions such as 
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“Why not be cruel?” or “Is it right to deliver n innocents over to be tortured to save the 
lives of m x n other innocents? If so, what are the correct values of n and m?” are 
simply not worth asking:  
 
Anybody who thinks that there are well-grounded theoretical answers to this 
sort of question—algorithms for resolving moral dilemmas of this sort—is still, 
in his heart, a theologian or a metaphysician. He believes in an order beyond 
time and change which both determines the point of human existence and 
establishes a hierarchy of responsibilities. (CIS, p. xv) 
 
When examining the intersection between his rejection of epistemology and his 
account of ethics, Rorty places a special emphasis on the novel, which he described 
as “the genre which gives us most help in grasping the variety of human life and the 
contingency of our own moral vocabulary.”13 In “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens,” 
Rorty comes closest to articulating a theory of the novel. “The novelist’s substitute for 
the appearance-reality distinction,” he suggests, “is a display of diversity of viewpoints, 
a plurality of descriptions of the same events. … What [the novelist] finds most heroic 
is not the ability sternly to reject all descriptions save one, but rather the ability to move 
back and forth between them.”14 As a consequence of this celebration of a plurality of 
descriptions, Rorty later suggested, in a manner significantly reminiscent of Paul de 







 Given Rorty’s characterizations of literature and his claims for its importance, 
we might expect his discussions of specific works to focus on striking new metaphors, 
linguistic ambiguities, or shifts in perspective or vocabulary, but what we in fact get is 
something rather different. His introduction to Pale Fire, for instance, contains no 
responses to or analyses of Nabokov’s very particular language. Instead, Rorty 
describes how “the reader” thinks and feels about various parts of the novel: we are 
“absorbed” by the “odd but charming” foreword, to which the poem is “a slightly 
unfortunate interruption”; we “find ourselves sharing Kinbote’s overwhelming 
disappointment” that John Shade’s poem was not about Zembla; amidst the thrill of 
Kinbote’s tale, we inadvertently forget about the deaths of the poet and his daughter; 
and, as a consequence of this lapse, we end the novel “wondering whether we like 
ourselves.”16 Rorty makes no allowance for the possibility that some people might not 
read Pale Fire sequentially (perhaps reading the poem before the foreword, or flicking 
between poem and commentary), let alone the possibility that readers might have 
diverse interests, pleasures, and moral sentiments. His conclusion is no less didactic: 
at the end of Nabokov’s novel, “we shall realize that we, like him and like everybody 
else, have both Shade-like and Kinbote-like sides. … Nabokov helps us remember 
that we can only respect what we can notice, and that it is often very hard for us to 
notice that other people are suffering.”17 
 This conclusion might sound familiar to readers of Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, where Rorty similarly claims that “the moral [of Lolita] is not to keep one’s 
hands off little girls but to notice what one is doing, and in particular to notice what 
people are saying. For it might turn out, it very often does turn out, that people are 
trying to tell you that they are suffering” (CIS, p. 164). Perhaps Rorty thought all 
Nabokov’s novels have the same “moral”; but what of his readings of other authors? 
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George Orwell was apparently also concerned with “sensitizing an audience to cases 
of cruelty and humiliation which they had not noticed” (CIS, p. 173); Charles Dickens 
“was interested … in making us aware of forms of suffering that we might have 
overlooked”; and Henry James “is good at showing us what it is like to notice things 
about other people—their needs, their fears, their self-descriptions, their descriptions 
of other people—which we are usually too egotistic to take account of.”18 Simon Stow 
is right to point out the conflict between these “non-ironic readings of literary texts,” 
which allow for only “one possible interpretation,” and Rorty’s philosophical belief in 
there being no single, “true” description of the world.19 But more damning for literary 
critics is the dull reiteration across readings of disparate works; E. D. Hirsch is not 
alone in proclaiming Rorty “a very fine literary critic,” but it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that a critic who has the same ideas about such rich and diverse texts is 
not a particularly good reader.20 
 The principal reason that Rorty’s interpretations fail to register the 
distinctiveness of the works he discusses, I suggest, is the absence of close reading—
or, more precisely, the absence of close reading that attends to the stylistic or formal 
qualities of a text, rather than only its narrative.21 On reflection, the preeminent status 
Rorty accords the novel form seems to be due less to its capacity to re-describe the 
familiar in strikingly new ways—a capacity poetry surely possesses to an equal if not 
greater degree—and more to its receptiveness to the kind of allegorical reading of 
narrative he was uninterested in moving beyond. In “The Pragmatist’s Progress,” a 
response to Umberto Eco’s essays on interpretation and overinterpretation, Rorty 
even criticizes de Man and J. Hillis Miller for valuing close reading so highly:  
 
I see the idea that you can learn about “how the text works” by using semiotics 
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to analyse its operation as like spelling out certain word-processing subroutines 
in BASIC: you can do it if you want to, but it is not clear why, for most of the 
purposes which motivate literary critics, you should bother.22 
 
To understand why Rorty is so dismissive of the practice of close reading, it is 
necessary to examine his understanding of both interpretation and the motivations of 
literary critics. The following section will consider Rorty’s more familiar, and not 
especially fruitful, account of “strong textualism,” which clumsily applies the pragmatist 
premise that knowledge is made rather than found, before turning to his more 




 In an early essay, “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century 
Textualism,” Rorty describes his ideal pragmatist reader, the “strong textualist,” who 
abandons the notion that “the secret of the text” can be discovered, and “asks neither 
the author nor the text about their intention.”23 Instead, this reader “simply beats the 
text into a shape which will serve his purpose … by imposing a vocabulary … on the 
text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used by the text or its author, 
and seeing what happens.”24 Rorty would later elaborate this view in “The Pragmatist’s 
Progress,” where he argues against Eco’s distinction between “interpreting” and 
“using”:  
  
Reading texts is a matter of reading them in the light of other texts, people, 
obsessions, bits of information, or what have you, and then seeing what 
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happens. What happens may be … so exciting and convincing that one has the 
illusion that one now sees what a certain text is really about. But what excites 
and convinces is a function of the needs and purposes of those who are being 
excited and convinced. So it seems to me simpler to scrap the distinction 
between using and interpreting, and just distinguish between uses by different 
people for different purposes. (PP, pp. 105-6)  
 
Rorty’s rejection of certainty and his insistence on the provisional nature of knowledge 
are all well and good, and would no doubt be accepted by many philosophically-
sophisticated critics. But what Rorty fails to recognize here is that many (and likely 
most) critics are motivated precisely by the desire to read and produce interpretations 
which are “so exciting and convincing that one has the illusion that one now sees what 
a certain text is really about”—and, for this purpose, close reading remains one of our 
best tools. In fact, the feeling of discovering the “secret” of a text, however provisional 
or illusory that feeling might be, is one of the great allures of criticism.25 Rorty cynically 
and, I think, wrongly supposes that critics are not concerned with what he calls the 
intentions of a text, and what we might call its singularity, its distinctiveness as a literary 
work. As Nicholas M. Gaskill points out in his discussion of pragmatism and literature: 
“There are some relations and reconstitutions a poem simply will not sustain; texts, 
like other things in the world, push back.”26 
 Attridge deftly illustrates how scepticism about the possibility of a final 
interpretation can be held alongside a deep concern with doing justice to the 
distinctiveness of a given work. Rhetorically posing the question of whether there is 




If “correct” means “fixed for all time,” then there isn’t, for the obvious reason 
that the meaning of a work changes as the context within which it is read 
changes …. But if “correct” means “appropriate to the time and place in which 
the reading takes place,” then the term has some purchase. At least it makes 
sense to have a discussion about the correctness of this or that reading of a 
text; there may be no final resolution, but we know the kinds of evidence that 
would be considered valid at the time of the discussion, and disagreements, if 
not abolished, can be refined. The dispute may turn out to be about the kind of 
correctness being sought—correctness for what purpose or in what arena.27  
 
By contrast with Attridge, Rorty’s unwillingness to recognize that, for the purposes of 
literary criticism, some interpretations are more or less justified than others in certain 
contexts underpins his dismissal of close reading. The absence of close attention to 
“how the text works” results in reductive and didactic readings of richly varied works, 





 Despite apparently condoning critics who impose their own interests and 
vocabularies onto literary texts, however, Rorty also offers another, very different 
account of literary criticism in “The Pragmatist’s Progress,” premised on a distinction 
between what he calls “methodical” and “inspired” reading:  
 
This is [the difference] between knowing what you want to get out of a person 
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or thing or text in advance and hoping that the person or thing or text will help 
you want something different—that he or she or it will help you to change your 
purposes, and thus to change your life. … Methodical readings are … the sort 
of thing you get, for example, in an anthology of readings on Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness which I recently slogged through …. None of the readers had, as far 
as I could see, been enraptured or destabilized by Heart of Darkness. I got no 
sense that the book had made a big difference to them, that they cared much 
….  
Unmethodical criticism of the sort which one occasionally wants to call 
“inspired” is the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, 
line or archaic torso which has made a difference to the critic’s conception of 
who she is, what she is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an 
encounter which has rearranged her priorities and purposes. (PP, pp. 106-7) 
 
Rorty conspicuously refuses to show us what inspired reading looks like, and consigns 
his own interpretation of Eco’s novel earlier in the essay to the methodical dustbin. His 
readings of Nabokov, Orwell, Dickens, James, and Proust are likewise “methodical” in 
this pejorative sense, insofar as Rorty seems to know in advance what he wants to 
get out of these radically different writers. With respect to Rorty’s prescription that 
critics suspend their prior purposes and priorities and instead be enraptured and 
destabilized by literature, it is worth noting that, notwithstanding de Man’s relative 
neglect of readerly affect, what he saw as valuable about close reading was precisely 
its potential to unsettle prior knowledge: “reading texts closely as texts … start[s] out 
from the bafflement that … singular turns of tone, phrase, and figure [are] bound to 
produce in readers attentive enough to notice them and honest enough not to hide 
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their non-understanding behind the screen of received ideas that often passes, in 
literary instruction, for humanistic knowledge.”28 We might also want to question the 
binary opposition Rorty draws here; can critics not be methodical and inspired? 
Nevertheless, the particular salience of Rorty’s “inspired reading” for contemporary 
methodological debates is his emphasis on both arresting the epistemological drive of 
academic criticism and disclosing the affective dispositions which underlie certain 
kinds of critical practice.  
 Rorty would extend this account into a full-blown critique of literary studies, as 
he saw it (mainly through the eyes of Harold Bloom) in 1995, in his MLA address, “The 
Inspirational Value of Great Works of Literature.”29 The thrust of his argument is that, 
under the influence of Fredric Jameson, literary critics have increasingly adopted an 
attitude of what Bloom called “resentment” and what Rorty calls “knowingness,” “a 
state of the soul which prevents shudders of awe,” and which “makes one immune to 
romantic interest” (IV, p. 126). Rorty juxtaposes “knowingness” with a criticism that 
aims to “find inspirational value in a text” through this suggestive analogy:  
 
Just as you cannot be swept off your feet by another human being at the same 
time that you recognize him or her as a good specimen of a certain type, so you 
cannot simultaneously be inspired by a work and be knowing about it. Later 
on—when first love has been replaced by marriage—you may acquire the 
ability to be both at once. But the really good marriages, the inspired marriages, 
are those which began in wild, unreflective infatuation. (IV, p. 133-4) 
 
As his use of “knowing” in its adjectival form indicates, Rorty objects not only to an 
excessive emphasis on what critics “know” about texts rather than what they feel about 
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them, but also to a specific affective orientation towards the literary work; in the place 
of suspicion and detached sophistication, Rorty wants critics to be enthralled by 
literature. It is in this mistrust of those who adopt a “knowing” attitude that we find a 
deeper concord between Rorty’s pragmatist critique of philosophy and his affection for 
literature and literary criticism, an affection he was unable to translate into a compelling 
reading practice.  
 Deidre Shauna Lynch has recently argued that “affective labor” is foundational 
to literary studies, and that “those of us for whom English is a line of work are also 
called upon to love literature.”30 This may be the case, but the more pertinent question 
is what role love of literature plays, or is allowed to play, in critical writing. Despite the 
so-called “affective turn” in literary studies (and the humanities more generally), 
scholars rarely discuss their own feelings about a given work in published criticism.31 
Felski has recently shown that “styles of academic reading are affective as well as 
cognitive, inviting us to adopt attitudes of trust, impatience, reverence, or wariness 
towards the texts we read,” and that “suspicious” interpretation, which like Rorty she 
associates with the influence of Jameson, “is not just an intellectual exercise in 
demystification but also a distinctive style and sensibility with its own specific 
pleasures.”32 Again, this might be the case, but for Rorty, the crucial issue is the 
relationship—or, as he sees it, the lack of relationship—between the pleasures of 
reading a book and the critic’s written response. There is much to fault with his analogy 
between reading and loving, not least the uncharacteristic social conservatism (in the 
suggestion that marriage exemplifies what is most desirable), the rhetoric of romantic 
enthusiasm, and the very narrow conception of the affects of reading; as de Man 
suggests, much sensitive criticism emerges from less transformative feelings of 
surprise, confusion, and delight. Nevertheless, alongside his philosophical account of 
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“liberal irony,” Rorty’s “inspired reading” offers a new vantage from which to approach 




 The salience of Rorty’s thought for contemporary methodological debates is 
best demonstrated by briefly considering perhaps the most significant—and certainly 
the most frequently cited—critical intervention of the last ten years: Stephen Best and 
Sharon Marcus’s “surface reading.”33 It is worth noting that Best and Marcus’s critique 
of symptomatic interpretation, which they also associate with Jameson, closely 
resembles Rorty’s complaint about “knowing” criticism. Surface reading immediately 
raises the question: what is the surface of a text, and how might it be meaningfully 
distinguished from depth?34 Best and Marcus indicate that “surface” is not meant 
literally, but rather refers to “what is evident, perceptible, apprehensible in texts; what 
is neither hidden nor hiding; what, in the geometrical sense, has length and breadth 
but no thickness, and therefore covers no depth. A surface is what insists on being 
looked at rather than what we must train ourselves to see through.”35 Though I am 
sympathetic with their dissatisfaction with the propensity of ideological critique to 
overlook aesthetic particularity, under this definition, arguably any description of a 
literary work as more than marks on a page or pixels on a screen fails to attend to its 
“surface.” Kristina Straub is right to point out that “‘surface’ pertains more to what we 
do with texts than the texts themselves,” but the distinction in critical approaches is 
predicated on a distinction between the different parts of the text the critic (apparently) 
attends to.36 My reading of Pale Fire will suggest that these kinds of distinctions are 
frequently impossible and rarely interesting to make. I, for one, have no idea what 
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about a literary work (or a reading of a literary work) “has length and breadth but no 
thickness.”37 In a sense, Best and Marcus are too credulous of their own critical 
metaphors, treating the dichotomy of “surface” and “depth” as a representation (or 
mirror) of how texts “really” are, rather than a figure that proves useful for critiquing 
certain kinds of interpretation, and rather less so far articulating alternatives. Following 
Rorty, it seems to me better to simply slough off the metaphor, which is unhelpfully 
premised on the notion that the best way of describing texts is in the language of 
material objects.38 To be more pragmatist about disciplinary “knowledge” is to stop 
posing quasi-ontological questions about the “nature” of literary works, and instead 
explore which critical vocabularies prove particularly useful for particular purposes.  
 The attachment to the figure of surface and depth is also deeply implicated in 
Best and Marcus’s lack of clarity about what they perceive to be the proper role of 
truth, knowledge, and affect in criticism. On the one hand, their endeavor to 
“understand … critical activity as something other than wresting truths from the hidden 
depths of resisting texts” seems to disavow truth as a desirable aim, as does their 
claim that surface reading can mean the “embrace” of “surface as affective and ethical 
stance.”39 On the other, Best and Marcus seem to want to reinstate truth by relocating 
it from a text’s depths to its surface: “moments that arrest us in texts need not be 
considered symptoms, whose true cause exists on another plane of reality, but can 
themselves indicate important and overlooked truths.”40 It is difficult to see why 
moments that arrest us should necessarily be seen as a matter of truth; readers are 
very often arrested by the peculiar language of a text—a daring combination of 
linguistic registers or a use of a word which brings into relief its fullest semantic 
possibilities. Indeed, that we can be moved by what we know to be not true is 
fundamental to fiction’s enduring appeal (as millions of readers can attest), and part 
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of what is peculiar about reading Pale Fire is the strange feeling of being moved by 
characters whose fictionality is being ostentatiously displayed.  
 What Jonathan Kramnick and Anahid Nersessian describe as the empiricist 
“hedge” of surface reading is most marked—and most problematic—with respect to 
the interpretative procedure Best and Marcus directly associate with the movement: 
modes of analysis that employ “minimal critical agency” and prefer “description” to 
“interpretation.”41 Ellen Rooney has fiercely critiqued this mode of surface reading for 
its pretensions to objectivity: “The representation of ‘critical description’ in ‘Surface 
Reading’ is neither a description of the way we read now nor a description of the way 
anyone might read, ever.”42 This criticism is partly addressed by Best, Marcus, and 
Heather Love in “Building a Better Description,” where they suggest: “One way to build 
a better description is to accept the basic critique of objectivity as impossible and 
undesirable. In response, we might practice forms of description that embrace 
subjectivity, uncertainty, incompleteness, and partiality.”43 Like Best, Marcus, and 
Love, I want critical description to be more highly valued in literary studies; in light of 
Rorty’s “inspired reading,” this article contributes to their cause an argument for a more 
partial and uncertain mode of description, whose principal concern is elucidating the 
distinctiveness of a work, and, by extension, why it is that we should care about it in 
the first place.  
 The following reading of Pale Fire aims to illustrate what a critical practice 
informed by Rorty’s accounts of “liberal irony” and “inspired reading” might look like. 
This chiefly amounts to two corresponding shifts in emphasis. Firstly, I aim to take up 
a less epistemological orientation that is less concerned with questions about what is 
“really going on” in a text, questions that in Nabokov criticism have resulted in 
interminable and not especially fruitful debate. In practical terms, this often means a 
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greater willingness to admit to being uncertain or even bewildered by the text. 
Secondly, the reading aims to be, if not more devotional, then more up front about the 
affective investments which impel me to write about Nabokov—because I find his 
novels beguiling, troubling, and profoundly moving. (When I describe the experience 
of “the reader” in this article, I am in fact giving an account of my own experience, 
whilst giving good reasons for supposing that it might speak to the experience of other, 
similarly attentive, readers—as most other critics are, without acknowledging the fact.) 
This is a critical practice which ultimately aspires to describe the text in ways that are 




 Pale Fire raises questions about how it should be read, in several senses of 
that word, more concertedly than perhaps any other novel. Its unusual construction, 
as foreword, poem, commentary, and index, immediately opens up several possible 
ways of proceeding; though many critics (including Rorty) assume that everyone 
begins at the beginning and ends at the end as with most other novels, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that first-time readers continue to make their way through the text 
in different ways.44 The foreword even recommends that we read the notes first “and 
then study the poem with their help” (PF, p. 28) either by purchasing a second copy 
or by cutting out the commentary—advice I suspect few readers follow. But beyond 
the more immediate question of what to read when lies the literary critical question 
raised by the strangeness of Kinbote’s commentary: what kind of reading, in the sense 
of a gloss or interpretation, can or should one give of this novel?  




Kinbote is not “making something up” when he reads the story of Zembla 
between the lines of Shade’s poem, any more than he is “representing 
inaccurately.” … It is important to see that Kinbote cares a great deal about 
Shade’s poem, even if for all the wrong reasons. He thinks very hard about it, 
even though his thought goes in utterly different directions from Shade’s. This 
illustrates the point that a perverse, egocentric commentary—what Bloom calls 
a “strong reading”—is still a commentary … [and] once we leave the realm of 
action for that of writing, it is no service to anyone to ask whether a reaction 
was “appropriate.” (CIS, p. 160-1, fn25)  
 
This is Rorty the radically permissive “strong textualist,” rather than the advocate of 
“inspired reading.” Kinbote’s response to the poem’s description of a “stiff [weather] 
vane so often visited / by the naïve, the gauzy mockingbird” (PF, p. 35) illustrates why 
we should be sceptical of Rorty’s claim: “Line 62: often. — Often, almost nightly, 
throughout the spring of 1959, I had feared for my life. Solitude is the playfield of Satan. 
I cannot describe the depths of my loneliness and distress” (PF, p. 74). Here at least, 
Kinbote doesn’t seem to care much about Shade’s poem—and, given his abject 
loneliness, it is perhaps not surprising that he has nothing to say about these rather 
staid lines. No doubt most readers find Kinbote’s writings about himself and Zembla 
extraordinary in their imagination and poetry—and amusing and appalling in their 
egotism—but they are not particularly useful for myself and other critical readers 
interested in how Shade’s poem works, and its distinctiveness as a literary text.  
 Pale Fire is often invoked as a paradigmatic instance of late or limit modernism, 
metafiction, or postmodernism avant la lettre, in global characterizations of the novel’s 
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narrative or genre (usually in terms of epistemological or ontological undecidability) 
that eschew close analysis of particular passages.45 This task has largely been left to 
those working in the rather isolated—and isolationist—field of Nabokov studies.46 As 
Will Norman points out, within this field, Pale Fire and, to a lesser extent, Ada or Ardor 
“have been the battlegrounds over which the debates about how to read Nabokov 
have been fought.”47 These debates have largely followed the course set by Brian 
Boyd, whose influence on Nabokov studies is difficult to overstate. In his first book, 
Nabokov’s Ada (1985, revised 2001), Boyd elaborates on Nabokov’s own analogy 
between reading and solving chess problems: texts initially set up a “resistance” to 
being understood, but “by finding an allusion, … locating the precise source of a 
teasing echo, … [or] catching an obscure pun,” readers identify “solutions” to the 
“myriad little problems” set by the author.48 Boyd adopts the same approach in his 
critical biographies and in Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1999), which again conceives “the 
relationship between author and reader” as akin to “that between problem-composer 
and problem-solver” (NPF, p. 9).49 This methodology is rigidly applied, with more or 
less every aspect of Nabokov’s writing described in terms of “problems” and 
“solutions.” That Boyd defends his approach by referring to Nabokov’s own belief in 
the homology between reading and problem-solving (NPF, pp. 122, 256) registers the 
extent to which this approach is essentially authorial intentionalism on a higher plane, 
the critic deferring not only to the author’s apparent views about how a specific work 
should be interpreted, but also to those about how all literature can or should be read.50 
That Pale Fire is in part a parody of biographical scholarship has not had the effect of 
abating the overt intentionalism of much Nabokov criticism, and those such as David 
Lodge, Michael Wood, and Martin Hägglund who have objected to this tendency have 
notably been met with short shrift.51 For the moment, however, I want to set aside this 
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legitimate complaint and consider the implications of Boyd’s approach for debates—
or, as I will suggest, the present lack of debate—about how to read Nabokov.  
 The influence of Boyd’s approach is most apparent in accounts which expressly 
challenge his own; later critics might disagree with Boyd’s specific conclusions, but 
they predominantly read Nabokov on his terms. Thomas Karshan, for instance, 
argues, pace Boyd, that Nabokov should be read “playfully” rather than for “definite 
truth,” because Pale Fire is not a “puzzle” with a single correct solution, but a “game” 
that resists final resolution; “after all, if it were a soluble puzzle, its art would be 
exhausted once the puzzle was solved.”52 Despite the apparent opposition, Karshan 
essentially agrees with Boyd that reading is a matter of trying to solve problems. The 
suggestion that art is exhausted once understood exemplifies the paucity of such 
cerebral accounts, which seem indifferent to the affective dimensions of reading. Even 
Michael Wood—to my mind the most sensitive and affective reader of Nabokov—
seems unable to free himself of epistemological preoccupations; though he suggests 
that, as readers of Nabokov, “we shall almost certainly lose … our certainty,” he hastily 
adds that “to lose certainty is not to lose understanding or knowledge,” as though 
uncertainty needed to be recuperated for epistemology.53 In a sense, Nabokov 
criticism marks a collective failure to perceive reading as something richer—something 
more interesting and more troubling—than the trials of trying, and sometimes failing, 
to know a text. Like Rorty reading the anthology of essays on Heart of Darkness, we 
have little sense of these critics being enraptured or destabilized by Nabokov’s writing.  
 Nabokov studies has recently undergone a belated historicist turn, with 
scholars showing themselves increasingly willing to transgress the author’s prohibition 
against introducing biographical, social, economic, or political context.54 These 
attempts to historicize Nabokov are often accompanied by an understandably weary, 
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but nevertheless insufficiently critical, attitude towards the interpretative strategies of 
previous critics, as though the question of how to read Nabokov had indeed been 
solved. Norman, for instance, charaterizes “close reading and annotation” as the 
“traditional” (ahistorical) approach to Nabokov—as though “annotation” and “close 
reading” were synonymous, and there were only one way of reading closely.55 Valuable 
as these recent historicist studies undoubtedly are, they risk abandoning the ground 
of reading wholesale, rather than critiquing—and exploring alternatives to—the 
excessively epistemological and affectively desensitized model of textual analysis. By 
contrast with the problem-solving approach that has dominated Nabokov criticism, the 
rest of this article aims to show how a critical orientation that embraces the feelings 
the writing gives rise to—and especially those readerly feelings of uncertainty and 
doubt in the face of textual complexity—enables us to better describe what is singular 




 The “problem” which has obsessively preoccupied most Nabokovian critics of 
Pale Fire concerns a debate about which character “really” wrote which sections of 
the novel.56 This preoccupation is perhaps not surprising, given the novel’s mise en 
abyme narrative structure and Kinbote’s manifestly unreliable narration. The strange 
echoes and repetitions of motifs, descriptive details, and intertextual allusions across 
Shade’s poem and Kinbote’s commentary have been the basis for several increasingly 
wild “theories of authorship”: that Shade wrote both poem and commentary; that 
Kinbote is the sole author; and, most outlandish of all, Boyd’s claim that the ghost of 
the poet’s dead daughter, Hazel Shade, influenced her father as he wrote the poem, 
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and that both father and daughter posthumously influence Kinbote as he writes the 
commentary.57 The shared premise of these theories is that the echoes in the novel 
are “not incidental ornaments but signposts to concealed sense” (NPF, p. 151)—
puzzles Nabokov sets the reader. Like Wood, I like the “echoes” and “unresolved 
difference” between the two parts of the novel, and simply “can’t see the interpretative 
need for the claim that either of these characters has invented the other.”58 The 
“problem” of internal authorship only arises if one assumes that everything in the novel 
should be accounted for in terms of authorial design, rather than conceived of as 
elements of a strange and beguiling fictional world intricately imagined by readers.  
 The most frequently cited evidence for the necessity of such theories is a 
passage from “Pale Fire” where Shade describes his vision of a “tall white fountain” 
(PF, p. 47) after suffering a heart attack, a vision he initially takes to be a glimpse of 
the afterlife. In his search for corroboration, Shade reads of someone else having a 
similar vision, only to discover that the newspaper article contained a crucial misprint—
“Mountain, not fountain. The majestic touch” (PF, p. 50). This prompts the following 
revelation:  
 
But all at once it dawned on me that this  
Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme;  
Just this: not text, but texture; not the dream 
But topsy-turvical coincidence,  
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense.  
Yes! It sufficed that I in life could find  
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind  
Of correlated pattern in the game 
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… Making ornaments  
Of accidents and possibilities. (PF, p. 50) 
 
Most critics follow Boyd in inferring from the passage that Shade resolves to examine 
his world so as to discern the design of its “author,” and treat this as a model for how 
to read the novel. Yet we might just as easily construe knowledge in Rortyan terms as 
a fundamentally human creation, and place emphasis on the making of “ornaments” 
from “accidents and possibilities,” as Karshan does: “Shade contends that we must 
abandon the ‘dream’ of absolute and final truth, instead weaving a ‘web of sense’ out 
of ‘topsy-turvical coincidence.’”59 More problematic, however, is the implicit contention 
that the poem should be treated as a methodological instruction or allegory, which 
once again reverts to the questionable assumption that literature can or should only 
be read as the author supposedly intended.  
 The way that language takes on meanings in excess of our intentions is in fact 
dramatized by one of the most frequently cited passages in the novel, which I want to 
discuss at some length—the opening of “Pale Fire.” Here are the first four lines of 
Shade’s poem and the beginning of Kinbote’s commentary:  
 
I was the shadow of the waxwing slain 
By the false azure in the windowpane; 
I was the smudge of ashen fluff—and I 
Lived on, flew on, in the reflected sky. (PF, p. 33) 
 
The image in these opening lines evidently refers to a bird knocking itself out, 
in full flight, against the outer surface of a glass pane in which a mirrored sky, 
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with its slightly darker tint and slightly slower cloud, presents the illusion of 
continued space. We can visualize John Shade in his early boyhood, a 
physically unattractive but otherwise beautifully developed lad, experiencing his 
first eschatological shock …. (PF, p. 73) 
 
Boyd is again the most influential interpreter of this passage, which he returns to 
numerous times in Nabokov’s Pale Fire:  
 
As we learn more about Shade’s lifelong attempt to understand a world where 
life is surrounded by death, we realize the full resonance of these opening lines: 
that he is projecting himself in imagination into the waxwing, as if it were 
somehow still flying beyond death, and into the reflected azure of the window, 
as if that were the cloudlessness of some hereafter, even as he stands looking 
at “the smudge of ashen fluff” of the dead bird’s little body. (NPF, p. 25) 
 
Boyd later adds that Shade “now lives on in this blue world of the beyond,” and the 
opening lines therefore have a “richer significance” and “mean more than he ever 
intended” (NPF, p. 217). Shortly, we will consider how Boyd follows Kinbote in 
domesticating the complexity of the emphatic series of first-person identifications at 
the beginning of the poem. But for the moment, I want to question whether this 
speculation about Shade surviving death amounts to “the full resonance” of these 






 Consider the weighty use of the past tense. Kinbote, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given his conspicuous sexual interest in young boys, reads this as an invocation of 
Shade’s childhood; Boyd equally unsurprisingly connects the tense with Shade’s 
apparent survival after death; and Wood, dismissing this reading as “entirely plausible 
but not all that interesting,” instead proposes that Shade is “remembering an occasion 
on which he literally died and did not die”—when his heart convulsed and temporarily 
stopped.60 Though I share Wood’s well-founded scepticism of otherworldly 
interpretations, he uncharacteristically overlooks how and why the passage engenders 
the kind of speculation made by Boyd; once aware of Shade’s death, it is difficult not 
to hear a painful dramatic irony in the past tense. The way the surrounding narrative 
alters the affective resonance of the lines underscores how words can mean more 
than their authors intend—something as true of Nabokov as of Shade—and thus that, 
as Rorty suggests, we read contextually, “in the light of other texts, people, 
obsessions, bits of information, or what have you.” The real question is what kinds of 
contexts we consider useful, interesting, or relevant for different kinds of purposes. 
For readers concerned with “how the text works,” Shade’s death (which is announced 
in the very first sentence of the novel) seems to me more salient than Nabokov’s 
purported views about the afterlife or the state of the American publication industry in 
the mid-twentieth century.  
 The story of the Shades similarly impinges upon the first line in a less obvious 
but no less consequential way in the possible allusion of “waxwing” to Icarus and 
Daedalus—a myth of peculiar significance in a poem about a father’s grief for his 
drowned child. The poem notably dwells on the uncertainty about whether Hazel’s 
death was accident or suicide, strongly implying the latter (PF, p. 50), and touches on 
the question of whether the girl’s parents were in any way culpable. Shade—perhaps 
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rather conceitedly—seems to partly blame himself for passing on to his daughter his 
own bad looks (PF, p. 43), though, as Wood shrewdly points out, Shade seems not to 
recognize the possibility that his preoccupation with Hazel’s appearance and sexual 
desirability might have contributed to her unhappiness.61 The blurring or confusion of 
accident and (self-)destruction is similarly played out in the opening end rhyme, “slain,” 
with its striking suggestion that the waxwing is deliberately and violently slaughtered 
rather than that it inadvertently kills itself, the note of accusation amplified by the 
unusual syntax and the stressed preposition at the beginning of the second line. 
Kinbote is surely right that “false azure” refers to the illusion of continued space in the 
window’s reflection, but “false” also disconcertingly introduces an ethical note. The 
emphasis placed on distinguishing the actual from the illusory only brings into sharper 
relief the degree to which these deceptively complex lines resist straightforward 
comprehension; Boyd might characterize them as “vivid, immediate, [and] accessible,” 
but I am not so sure.62 
 At the heart of the complexity of these lines is their ambiguous metaphoricity, 
which centers around the “shadow” of the opening line. Meanwhile, by virtue of the 
repetition of personal pronouns, the dearth of prepositions, and the use of punctuation 
that declines to specify the semantic relationships between clauses, it remains unclear 
whether one, two, or three moments in time are being described. The sentence might 
be read as a chronological description, the speaker first identifying with the shadow of 
the waxwing and then the smudge of ashen fluff, and then (literally or imaginatively?) 
living and flying on in the reflected sky. Or we might read the “I” of the first two clauses 
as identical, the speaker characterizing his past self as both body (“ashen fluff”) and 
disembodied spirit (“shadow”), before the dash signals a transformation to another 
kind of selfhood that persists beyond death. Or this might be a series of empathetic 
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identifications with different phenomena, the speaker imagining being a bird’s shadow, 
then its dead body, and finally a waxwing which is not killed by the windowpane. The 
last perhaps seems most likely, and yet presents the greatest barrier to the 
imagination—can we envision what it would be like to be an effect of light or a smudge 
of unfeeling matter? These richly suggestive lines remain subtly, stubbornly 
indeterminate, inviting many such readings without allowing the reader to finally settle 
on one or another—and it is precisely their elusiveness that compels me to repeatedly 
return to them. Like much of the novel, the passage at once provokes and ultimately 
confounds final comprehension, whilst the ethical charge of “slain” and “false” ups the 
affective stakes, raising the worry that not understanding these lines might in some 
sense amount to a moral failing. The feeling that the writing is at once soliciting and 
wryly withholding definite explication is part of what gets lost when other critics claim 
to know what is “really” going on in this text. This is not to abandon the critical 
aspiration to do justice to the singularity of the work (even if we recognize that a final 
reading is ultimately unattainable), but to say that there are better—more intricate, 
interesting, and compelling—ways of describing texts than by identifying and “solving” 
quasi-ontological problems.  
 The literary qualities of the passage discussed above are easy enough to 
observe, yet have attracted no critical comment, despite countless readings. This 
might be because critics have considered them too obvious or inconsequential to 
mention, but I suspect not; it seems more likely that these qualities are passed over 
because they slow down or resist incorporation into grander and more assured 
accounts of the novel. I am certainly not claiming to have captured the “full resonance” 
of these lines; indeed, part of my argument, following Rorty, is precisely that we should 
abandon the notion of exhaustive commentary, because texts continue to be read in 
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different contexts and described in different vocabularies. But I am suggesting that a 
preoccupation with “knowing” Pale Fire has impeded critics from effectively describing 
what is distinctive about Nabokov’s writing.  
 The literary qualities of the opening of Shade’s poem also illustrate the kinds of 
practical difficulties surface reading can face when confronted with a textual example. 
Is reading the past tense in the light of Shade’s death to look “through” rather than “at” 
the passage? Do potential allusions of great emotional significance—in this case, to a 
mythical bereaved parent—belong to the text’s surface or depth? Which of the 
figurative readings invited by the opening lines are “apprehensible,” and which 
“hidden”? Not much is to be gained by making distinctions of this kind—and, of course, 
one of the reasons that I chose this passage is precisely because it dramatizes the 
difficulties of distinguishing surface from depth, and object from effect. It is in this 
sense that surface reading, in reifying the figure of text as object, risks tethering itself 
to a naive belief that literary works have intrinsic meanings in and of themselves, rather 




 Nabokov critics have tended to take an excessively epistemological approach 
to Pale Fire primarily because of the novel’s manifest narrative and stylistic complexity. 
However, the novel also conspicuously foregrounds the ways in which a preoccupation 
with knowing the text can disable or overwhelm other kinds of responses, including 
ethical and affective ones. Perhaps the most flagrant examples of this are the 
elaborate analogies which populate Nabokov’s fiction. This is Kinbote’s allegory about 
how “a good Zemblan Christian” feels about the afterlife, as something which cannot 
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be known but which one places a benevolent faith in:  
 
To take a homely example: little Christopher’s family is about to migrate to a 
distant colony where his father has been assigned to a lifetime post. Little 
Christopher, a frail lad of nine or ten, relies completely (so completely, in fact, 
as to blot out the very awareness of this reliance) on his elders’ arranging all 
the details of departure, passage and arrival. He cannot imagine, nor does he 
try to imagine, the particular aspects of the new place awaiting him but he is 
dimly and comfortably convinced that it will be even better than his homestead, 
with the big oak, and the mountain, and his pony, and the park, and the stable, 
and Grimm, the old groom, who has a way of fondling him whenever nobody is 
around. (PF, pp. 219-220) 
 
This “example” may be many things, but I suspect most readers do not find it 
“homely”—comfortable, friendly, everyday—as Kinbote does. What is so discomforting 
about the passage is, of course, the serenity with which the sexual abuse of a child is 
alluded to and the suggestion that, far from harming him, this abuse is merely part of 
the routine pleasures of his domestic life. The tale naturally reflects poorly on the teller, 
in hinting at Kinbote’s idealization of pederasty and his indifference to the feelings of 
its victims, whether they be real or imagined. But it simply makes no sense to think 
about the “truth” or “reality” of this scene, and to do so would be to miss what is at 
once troubling and comic about this moment in the novel.  
 The claim of overtly fictional characters on readers’ feelings and ethical interests 
is not a peculiarity of this text’s hypothetical and counterfactual descriptions, but has 
much larger implications for our understanding of Nabokov’s fiction. Against the grain 
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of Nabokov criticism, Ellen Pifer has persuasively argued for a greater attention to the 
novels’ “interest in human beings, not only as artists and dreamers but as ethical 
beings.”63 However, Pifer’s emphasis on studying “the nature of each character’s 
unique reality” ultimately falls back on a naive view of characters simply as fictional 
persons, shorn of the particularity of their representation.64 John Frow has explored 
the tension between “thinking of characters as pieces of writing or imaging, and 
thinking of them as person-like entities,” and argued that “these two ways of thinking 
about character are logically difficult to hold together; and yet we do so in our every 
encounter with fictional character: the problem is to find a language in which to convey 
this ontological hybridity.”65 This more nuanced account gets us closer to the 
peculiarity of Nabokov’s novel, which at once foregrounds the fictionality of its 
characters and mobilizes feelings of ethical discomfort, making readers acutely aware 
of the surprising similarity between our feelings towards living persons and fictional 
characters—what Frow describes as “the processes of affective engagement by which 
textual constructs acquire their hold on readers, acting on us as though they were 
real.”66 Part of what makes Pale Fire such an unusual novel is the undeterminable 
fictionality of its compelling central character (or characters?), Charles Kinbote, aka 
King Charles Xavier “The Beloved.” Peter J. Rabinowitz has suggested that, because 
it “makes us more aware of the novel as art, as construct,” Pale Fire is “generally 
unmoving, witty and brilliant as it may be.”67 But for myself—and, I suspect, for many 
other readers captivated by Nabokov’s writing—what is remarkable about the novel is 






 Through a reading of Pale Fire animated by Rorty’s descriptions of “liberal 
irony” and “inspired reading,” which is less epistemological and more affective in its 
orientation, I have tried to show the need for critics to be more honest and explicit 
about the ways that literary works elude our understanding, and to illustrate that close 
readings that embrace and explore such frustrations of understanding can, 
paradoxically, lead to better descriptions of texts. This frustration should, in turn, also 
encourage us to be more provisional—and perhaps more pragmatist—about our 
critical methods. To return to one salient example, the structuring metaphor of surface 
reading has made possible a compelling and persuasive theoretical critique of prior 
interpretative strategies that are insufficiently attentive to the texture of literary 
writing—but, when taken as a truth about how literary works “really” are, it threatens 
to impede rather than enable engaged critical description. What Rorty’s thought offers 
to literary critics today is not only a salutary reminder about the constructed nature of 
disciplinary knowledge—and especially the knowledge of what literary works are—but 
also a challenge to explore what else we might do with texts other than know them.  
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